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Abstract In this paper, we propose to analyze the phenomenon of Christian prayer
by way of combining two different analytical frameworks. We start by applying
Schutz’s theories of ‘‘intersubjectivity,’’ ‘‘inner time,’’ ‘‘politheticality,’’ and
‘‘multiple realities,’’ and then proceed by drawing on the ideas and insights of
linguistic philosophers, notably, Wittgenstein’s ‘‘language-game,’’ Austin’s ‘‘speech
act,’’ and Evans’s ‘‘logic of self-involvement’’. In conjoining these accounts, we
wish to demonstrate how their combination sheds new light on understanding the
phenomenon of prayer. Prayer is a complex phenomenon that involves two major
dimensions: the private and the social, as Matthew (6: 6) and Acts (1: 14),
respectively, demonstrate. Schutz’s study of the phenomenon of ‘‘inner time’’ and
the ‘‘polithetical’’ structure of consciousness, at both the subjective and intersub-
jective level, provides a useful lens to analyze these two dimensions. In addition,
prayer, in following a specific set of rules, can also be considered as a specific, i.e.,
religious ‘‘language-game’’. In the last analysis, however, we propose to analyze
prayer (and, finally, religion) within the Schutzian framework of ‘‘multiple reali-
ties,’’ ‘‘enclaves,’’ and ‘‘symbolic appresentation,’’ which permits accessing the
‘‘religious finite province of meaning’’ in the very midst of the paramount reality of
everyday life. In a nutshell, we claim that Christian prayer is a practice of con-
structing and living within a ‘‘religious province of meaning’’ in the everyday
world; it is a practice that revolves around self-involving language-activities such as
praising, confessing, thanksgiving, or requesting to God, which enable the praying
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world of everyday life in order to let it appear in a different light, e.g., the light of
grace, gift, and salvation.
Keywords Schutz  Wittgenstein  Prayer  Christianity  Speech act  Language-
game  Multiple realities
Introduction
Whereas phenomenology bears an analytical focus on ‘‘consciousness’’ as its central
theme, linguistic philosophy analyzes ‘‘language’’ as its central theme. Without a
doubt, these two traditions have not been harmonious or sometimes have even been
opposed to each other for nearly 100 years. According to our understanding,
however, they can be consolidated very well when being applied to concrete
analyses: in this essay, we shall demonstrate this for the analysis of ‘‘prayer’’ which
indeed consists of two aspects, namely, a conscious aspect and a linguistic one.
Firstly, prayer emerges in the world of daily life and constructs its meaningful
‘‘field’’ or ‘‘enclave’’ in the very midst of this world. In other words, prayer jumps
out of the horizon of the flow of consciousness into the core of an experience of
‘‘transcending everydayness’’. As to our hypothesis, we can analyze this process
very well from the perspective of Schutzian phenomenology. Secondly, prayer—
being realized in acts of praising, confessing, thanksgiving, or requesting to God—is
definitely a linguistic activity, i.e., a ‘‘performative’’ or ‘‘self-involving’’ activity. In
a second step, we will analyze this aspect from the perspectives of Austin and
Evans. Finally, however, we propose to come back to Schutz: his account of ‘‘finite
provinces of meaning’’ offers viable conceptual devices to give an account of the
capacity of prayer to ‘‘see through’’ the world of everydayness, to transcend its
cognitive style, and to partake in a logic (e.g., the logic of grace, salvation,
redemption, etc.) that escapes the limitations of the ‘‘pragmatic motive’’. Since, as
Schutz emphasizes, ‘‘it is the meaning of our experiences, and not the ontological
structure of the objects, which constitutes reality’’ (Schutz 1945b: 341), this implies
that the meaning of experiences in prayer constitutes its reality. This meaning
undoubtedly is connected with language but also with its constitution in
consciousness, which, according to Schutz, has to be understood in terms of an
inherently embodied intentionality. The reality of prayer, thus, is co-constituted by
human consciousness and language, a fact which shall be demonstrated by recourse
to Schutz’s theory of ‘‘finite provinces of meaning’’.
Viewed against this background, we propose to combine these two qualitatively
different philosophical disciplines in order to analyze the religious phenomenon of
prayer, which, according to various commentators, has to be located at the core of
religion. As a by-product, we wish to demonstrate that the two traditions need no
longer be considered to be opposed to each other, but can very well be incorporated
by way of concrete analyses—prayer being the issue at hand.
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Contemporary Religion and Prayer as the Core/Essence of Religion
A historical review of the world’s religions reveals the practice of various forms of
prayer. In this article, we focus on those of Christianity in the context of the present,
secularized age in which Berger’s ‘‘Sacred Canopy’’ is of fading significance.
The secularization of religion has been a topic of great debate among sociologists
of religion since the 1960s. Though religious consciousness has been intensifying in
some areas, and among some people, secularization has been promoted in many of
the world’s big cities and urban neighborhoods as a result of prevailing ways of
thinking and knowing, including those of the natural sciences.
Since the 1990s, because of the development of medical machines such as PET,
fMRI, SPECT or MEG, the neurosciences have made great progress. Neuroscien-
tists have begun to delve into describing religious experiences during meditation,
prayer, or ‘‘encounters’’ with God. While some outstanding neuroscientists (for
example, Benjamin Libet and Nobel laureate John Eccles) were devoutly religious
(Jewish and Christian respectively), many other neuroscientists, including another
Nobel laureate, Francis Crick, either do not profess religious faith or are agnostic.
Many materialistic neuroscientists reduce religious experiences to the physical
functions of the brain. Their conclusion appears to be that those who are religious
can have religious experiences even if God does not exist.
Apart from neuroscientists, Cupitt, a philosopher of religion, has pointed out the
necessity of a radical change or paradigm shift in religious thinking:
If all our received religious traditions have now come to an end and a Second
Axial Age [sc., an epoch in which we must be prepared to rethink everything]
has perhaps already begun, then we need radically new religious thinking. We
need, for a time at least, to abandon the old institutions, the old doctrines, the
old vocabularies, and even the old assumptions about what religion is. Thus
‘pure’ religious thinking is a post-traditional kind of thinking that breaks with
the past and attempts to make a new beginning. (Cupitt 2001: 9)
[…] we have to forget all forms of the notions that something supremely Real
out there [sc., God] controls reality and grounds all of our knowledge and
values. On the contrary, what we see as being out there [sc., God or supreme
Reality] is only our own ever changing projection [sc., of language]. There is
no objective reality, no objective truth, no objective value, and no objective or
absolute knowledge. (Cupitt 2001: 14)
Furthermore, Cupitt stresses the supreme role of language, given that everything
is constructed through our use of language:
We don’t need metaphysics. Look around you: what you see is only sense
experience which has been formed as such by our language, and by language
(including the language of our theory) has been stitched together to make a
continuous world. We assemble it all [sc., by language], and we give to it its
apparent ‘reality’ [sc., by language]. (Cupitt 2001: 9f.)
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We cannot know objectively whether God as reality itself exists or not. But
Cupitt’s viewpoint reflects one of the notable trends of modern thought. In any case,
we could say that even if God does not exist as objective reality, people can still talk
about and believe in God as ‘‘an intentional object’’ that is constructed by language.
Whereas in the present era we are not mandated to believe that a supreme God
controls everything, Schutzian perspectives are still useful for analyzing the
phenomenon of prayer. The reasons are as follows. First, even if we cannot know
whether God really exists, we can construct ‘‘religious reality’’ through language.
Second, although the neurosciences have advanced greatly, research in this field has
not yielded any essential insights on ‘‘consciousness,’’ with which Schutz is deeply
concerned. Thus, consciousness remains—despite all attempts at (re)naturalizing
it—shrouded in mystery. Third, the Schutzian and neuroscientific approaches to
prayer differ, or entail different and autonomous ‘‘language-games’’. A Schutzian
approach to consciousness cannot be reduced to a neuroscientific one.
Heiler, the author of the classic Prayer: A Study in the History and Psychology of
Religion (1932), considers prayer to be the central feature of religion. Taking an
expansive view of religious adherents, including religious scholars and theologians
of all creeds and tendencies, he states that all of them concur that ‘‘prayer is the
central phenomenon of religion, the very hearthstone of all piety’’. Faith is, in
Luther’s judgment, ‘‘prayer’’ and ‘‘nothing but prayer’’. We should, moreover, note
that even Feuerbach, the most radical of the critics of religion, declares that ‘‘the
innermost essence of religion is revealed, by the simplest act of religion—prayer’’
(see Heiler 1932: xiii–xv).
Heiler quotes a number of views on prayer put forward by well-known
individuals versed in Christian traditions. Those cited here are unanimous in their
confirmation of prayer as a central feature of religion. Arndt, a great Protestant
mystic, repeatedly emphasizes that ‘‘without prayer we cannot find God; prayer is
the means by which we seek and find Him’’. Schleiermacher, who revived
Protestant theology, observes: ‘‘To be religious and to pray—that is really one and
the same thing’’. Rothe, also a Protestant theologian, states: ‘‘the religious impulse
is essentially the impulse to pray. It is by prayer, in fact, that the process of the
individual religious life is governed, the process of the gradual fulfillment of God’s
indwelling in the individual and his religious life […]. Therefore, the non-praying
man is rightly considered to be religiously dead’’. Deissmann, another Protestant
theologian, holds that: ‘‘religion, wherever it is alive in man, is prayer’’. Tiele, one
of the founders of the science of comparative religion, opines: ‘‘Where prayer has
wholly ceased, it is all over with religion itself’’. Sabatier, a philosopher and
religious scholar, says: ‘‘Where the prayer of the heart is wanting, there is no
religion’’. Lastly, Hettinger, a Catholic apologist, describes prayer as ‘‘the first,
highest, and most solemn phenomenon and manifestation of religion’’ (see Heiler
1932: xiii–xvi).
Based on these views, Heiler concludes as follows:
Accordingly, there can be no doubt at all that prayer is the heart and centre of
all religion. Not in dogmas and institutions, not in rites and ethical ideals, but
in prayer do we grasp the peculiar quality of the religious life. In the words of
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a prayer we can penetrate into the deepest and the most intimate movements of
the religious soul. (Heiler 1932: xv)
More recently, Chre´tien, the author of The Ark of Speech (2004), starts a
phenomenological study of prayer with the following words:
Prayer is the religious phenomenon par excellence, as it is the human act that
alone opens up the religious dimension and never ceases to sustain, to bear, to
suffer that opening […]. With prayer the religious phenomenon begins and
ends. (Chre´tien 2004: 17)
Phenomenology and Prayer
In what follows, we will focus on two types of prayer: solitary prayer and collective
prayer with others. An example of the former is mentioned in Matthew (6: 6): ‘‘But
whenever you pray, go into your room and shut the door and pray to your Father
who is in secret’’.1An example of the latter occurs in Acts (1: 14): ‘‘All these
[people] were constantly devoting themselves to prayer, together with certain
women, including Mary the mother of Jesus, as well as his brothers’’. These two
types of prayers are closely connected with and supportive of each other.2 We
suggest that Schutzian perspectives are helpful for investigating those two aspects of
prayer, since they allow for reflecting both the subjective and intersubjective aspects
of consciousness.
Schutz’s analysis of the ‘‘interplay’’ between subjective and intersubjective
experience requires careful examination. His discussion in ‘‘Making Music
Together’’ (1951), which aims to provide a foundation for transpersonal experience,
is concrete and persuasive. He refers to Wiese’s ‘‘contact-situations,’’ Scheler’s
perceptual theory of the alter ego, and Sartre’s core concept of ‘‘looking at the Other
and being looked at by the Other,’’ etc. Schutz relates all these accounts to his
endeavor to investigate the ‘‘mutual tuning-in relationship’’ on which alone all
varieties of communication are founded. In Schutz’s words: ‘‘It is precisely this
mutual tuning-in relationship by which the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ are experienced by
both participants as a ‘We’ in vivid presence’’ (Schutz 1951: 161).
1 All quotations from the Bible are based on the New Revised Standard Version.
2 As for the respective importance of collective/communal prayer and individual/solitary prayer,
Chre´tien provides the reader with a brief historical survey (Chre´tien 2004: 33f.) and points out: ‘‘the
superiority of collective prayer is emphasized by numerous religious traditions’’ (Chre´tien 2004: 33) and
‘‘In Christianity […] all prayer is in essence communal, since every individual prays and can pray […]
only as a member of the Mystic Body of Christ, and thus always within the Church’’ (Chre´tien 2004: 34).
In terms of our phenomenological perspective employed here, however, individual/solitary prayer is also
important because, methodologically regarded, the analysis of collective/communal prayer presupposes
access to the level of individual/solitary consciousness and the meaning-bestowing activities that occur in
the stream of consciousness. The ‘‘superiority of collective prayer,’’ thus viewed, has to be understood as
an existential superiority. In other words, even motionless or silent prayer in the remoteness of, e.g.,
ascetic seclusion is but a modality of its basic sociality—but one that derives its significance from its
individual articulation.
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Prayer, fostered in a religious community or society, consists of words, phrases,
and sentences that are conceptually constructed by this group. Viewing prayer as a
collection of concepts emphasizes its social construction. However, focusing
specifically on religious experience (not religious images, symbolic systems, or
cosmologies), Spickard (1991: 193) criticizes Berger’s and Luckmann’s interpre-
tation of Schutz, because they read him through a Sumnerian or Durkheimian lens
that precludes consideration of religious experience per se. Religious experience is a
subjective phenomenon, therefore we must not cut off the experience from the realm
of experiencing subjectivity. Spickard summarizes Husserl’s phenomenology and
Schutz’s application of it to sociology as follows:
Husserlian phenomenology attempts to ground secure knowledge in […]
subjectivity by means of a rigorous examination of experience. In particular,
Schutz’s application of phenomenology to sociology is an attempt to highlight
the interplay between social life and experience—not to demonstrate the
hegemony of the former. Schutz certainly thought of himself as a phenome-
nologist of the Husserlian school. (Spickard 1991: 193)
The ‘‘mutual tuning-in relationship,’’ that is, the very possibility of shared
experience, is closely related to the ‘‘polythetic’’ constitution of our experience.
Schutz provides the following description of such a polythetic interrelation of
recollections, retentions, protentions, and anticipations by reference to a piece of
music:
For our purposes a piece of music may be defined […] as a meaningful
arrangement of tones in inner time […]. The flux of tones unrolling in inner
time is an arrangement meaningful to both the composer and the beholder,
because and in so far as it evokes in the stream of consciousness participating
in it an interplay of recollections, retentions, protentions and anticipations
which interrelate the successive elements. (Schutz 1951: 170)
Adopting the same perspective, Spickard, emphasizing the polythetic aspect of
prayer, notes:
Like music or poetry, prayer is a polythetic phenomenon. It presents a stream
of images that structure inner time. It guides the hearer from image to image:
backward as the images repeat what has been, forward as they foretell what is
to come. Where theology is meant to convince, ritual prayer is meant to be
experienced. (Spickard 1991:200)
People who devote themselves to prayer are apparently experiencing—or rather:
living through—such a polythetic process. This can be illustrated through the
‘‘Lord’s Prayer,’’ which is a central prayer in Christianity appearing in the two
Gospels of Matthew and Luke. In the Gospel of Matthew (6: 9–13) Jesus states:
Pray then in this way: Our Father in heaven, hallowed be your name.
Your kingdom come. Your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven.
Give us this day our daily bread.
And forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors.
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And do not bring us to the time of trial, but rescue us from the evil one.
When Christians pray: ‘‘Give us this day our daily bread,’’ some of them might
be recollecting a past time when food was scarce, or anticipating a future time when
they will receive daily bread. When they pray, ‘‘forgive us our debts,’’ they might be
reflecting on their intended acts and deciding not to commit that crime again. When
they pray, ‘‘rescue us from the evil one,’’ they might be remembering an unhappy
past and imagining a peaceful future. During prayer, as Schutz mentions, believers
experience the interplay of recollections, retentions, protentions, and anticipations,
whereby successive elements are interrelated on a largely pre-reflective level. Or, as
Spickard suggests, prayer may be seen to provide guidance from image to image:
backward as the images repeat what has been; forward as they foretell what is to
come.
The world of daily life pre-exists our birth and is experienced and interpreted by
us as an organized, i.e., socially derived and pre-structured world. In short, this
meaningful constitution of the social world is the basis of all our experiences,
thinking, and actions. Schutz developed an integrated phenomenological approach
for examining the ‘‘world of daily life,’’ which is also commonly referred to as ‘‘the
world of everyday life,’’ ‘‘the everyday world,’’ ‘‘the paramount reality,’’ ‘‘the
paramount world of real objects and events,’’ or ‘‘the Life-world,’’ if taken from a
mundane standpoint. In this context, he enumerated six characteristics of this world
as follows: (1) A specific tension of consciousness, namely, ‘‘wide-awakeness,’’
which originates in an attitude of full attention to life. (2) A specific epoche´, namely,
the suspension of doubt. (3) A prevalent form of spontaneity through working or
gearing-into the world (Wirken). (4) A specific form of experiencing one’s self (the
working self as the total self). (5) A specific form of sociality (the common
intersubjective world of communication and social action). (6) A specific time-
perspective (standard time originating in an intersection between dure´e and cosmic
time as the universal temporal structure of the intersubjective world) (see Schutz
1945a: 230f).
Viewed against this background, the ‘‘field’’ wherein prayer is practiced can be
understood as an ‘‘enclave,’’ which is unfolded by human consciousness in the midst
of the world of daily life. By enclave, Schutz points at the overlapping of various
realities or the fact that ‘‘regions belonging to one province [are] enclosed by
another’’ (Schutz 1945a: 233 note); they are, as he also puts this, looped into
‘‘foreign territory’’ (Schutz 1945b: 307). Thus, we may describe an ‘‘enclave’’ as a
privileged site or as an institutionalized point of entry into another ‘‘finite province
of meaning,’’ which introduces or prescribes the ‘‘particular cognitive style’’ and
‘‘attentional attitude’’ (Schutz 1945a: 233 note) necessary in order to enter another
reality.3
Schutz explains that each finite province has ‘‘its particular style of a set of our
experiences’’. This includes: (1) a specific tension of consciousness, (2) a specific
3 As regards our overall topic, an interesting example for the ‘‘bridging of multiple realities’’ from within
the specific enclave of ‘‘computer religious worlds’’ is given by Waltemathe (2014). A more general
presentation of the concept with reference to art as an ‘‘enclave of meaning’’ is provided by McDuffie
(1995).
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time-perspective, (3) a specific form of experiencing oneself, and (4) a specific form
of sociality. The enactment of such a particular cognitive style or attitude (e.g., by
variously bracketing the relevancies of everydayness and entering the worlds of
theory, art, religion, etc.) constitutes the enclave (e.g., the laboratory, the theater, the
temple, etc.) as the privileged and habitual site of accessing another finite province
of meaning in which all experiences appear consistent in themselves and compatible
with one another (see Schutz 1945b: 341). Yet, this finiteness implies that ‘‘there is
no possibility of referring one of these provinces to the other by introducing a
formula of transformation’’ (Schutz 1945a: 232). The passing from one province to
another can only be performed through what Kierkegaard refers to as a ‘‘leap,’’
which ‘‘manifests itself in the subjective experience of a shock’’ (Schutz 1945a:
232).
To return to our example: Christians pray to God because they believe that He
ordered them to do so and promised to listen to their voices. Thus, prayer came into
existence as a response to this call from God. The field, reality, or enclave of prayer
can consequently be understood as one whose nature is completely different from
that of the world of daily life. Referring to Schutz’s earlier cited statement, there is
no ‘‘formula of transformation’’ between these worlds.
The exposition of Augustine Ichiro Okumura, a Japanese Carmelite, resonates
well with Schutz’s explanation of the relation between the world of daily life and
the enclave or finite province of prayer. He interprets prayer as ‘‘breaking off all
relations with daily affairs’’4 (Okumura 1974: 126) and states:
What we have to study in prayer is firstly to die, to realize the emptiness of
ourselves. Facing with God who is infinite and eternal, we have to see the very
transitory nature of ourselves as it is and study to die in/with God. These
things should lie at the bottom of prayer. We must have the experience of
death even during short-time prayer. While we are devoting ourselves to
prayer, we must never think of ordinary life. (Okumura 1974: 123)
In this context, ‘‘to die’’ means to break off or inhibit all relations with the world of
daily life. The analogy of this procedure with the phenomenological epoche´ is
apparent; accessing the religious province of meaning thus entails a sort of
‘‘religious epoche´’’.
Furthermore, Okumura states: ‘‘While we are engaging in prayer, we can be said
to transcend time within the stream of standard or objective time, and transcend the
space within it. In other words, we transcend the world, while staying in it’’
(Okumura 1974: 135). For him, the most important principle of prayer is ‘‘to cut off
the stream of consciousness of daily life at the right angles, as a bamboo marks off
itself with its joints’’ (Okumura 1974: 125f.). We should not bring daily affairs into
prayer. ‘‘To die,’’ in the sense used by him, conveys all these meanings and actions.
Breaking off all relations with the daily world is the ‘‘breaking bravely with daily
life whose vacancy we know’’ (Okumura 1974: 145).
It may not be possible for a non-Christian to understand what Okumura is trying
to convey, because it sounds contradictory. As we know, however, religious
4 All the quotations from Okumura’s work are based on Hoshikawa’s provisional translation (K. H.).
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teachings quite often transcend the usual modes of thinking and understanding.
Referring once more to the earlier statement by Schutz, there is no reference through
a ‘‘formula of transformation’’ between the religious province of meaning opened
up by prayer and that of daily life.
In other words, the departure from the world of daily life can be understood as
one of coming out of that world and entering into the religious province of meaning
via the enclave of prayer. Given that no ‘‘formula of transformation’’ exists between
these two worlds, when a Christian breaks off relations with the world of everyday
life to pray, he or she must do so, as Okumura emphasizes, in the same way as a
bamboo marks off itself with joints at right angles. This implies that a person
transits from the province of the everyday world to that of prayer by shifting the
accent of reality, or by changing the direction of the stream of consciousness. This
‘‘transition,’’ however, must not be misinterpreted as a sort of real migration from
one ontological level to another, but as a modification or alteration of the perception
and evaluation of the everyday world.
Prayers are sometimes said by individually motivated believers, sometimes they
are collectively brought forward by a group. In both cases, believers respond to the
vacancies, inconsistencies, or deficiencies of everydayness by addressing a new
theme or reality in prayer; in transforming given meaning-structures they propose to
‘‘see through’’ the relative naturalness of the paramount reality one lives in without
reflecting upon it. In other words, the world of prayer intrudes into the horizon of the
believer’s flow of experience, breaching its quasi-ontological homogeneity. In this
process, the lived unity of our ways of perceiving the everyday world collapses and
the new vision endorsed in prayer becomes thematic and may, finally, receive the
accent of reality. Prayer, put differently, ‘‘jumps out’’ of the horizon of the flow of
experience into the very core of experience, thus opening pathways to transfigure our
predominant ways of experiencing. At the same time, the dominant theme or
relevance that captures one’s attention in the everyday world—e.g., working hard,
driving a car, or chatting with friends—which has prevailed unanimously until this
time, is abandoned (see Schutz and Luckmann 1974: 186–190) and something
‘‘wholly other’’ comes to mind.5
The processes carried out before, in, and after prayer can be described as follows.
In the first place, Christian believers who have not yet committed to prayer are
living in the everyday world. Having suspended any doubt of that world, they take it
for granted, living their usual social lives that rely on common sense, communi-
cation with others, social roles, and the standard time of the intersubjective world—
all this taking place under the yoke of the ‘‘pragmatic motive’’ that structures our
average existence. Those who are about to devote themselves to prayer—for
5 The experience of the ‘‘wholly other’’ may, of course, be qualified in infinitely different ways, like, e.g.,
with regard to the ultimate futility of all our mundane achievements and our finitude, the non-identifiable
call of the other person, the sublimity of nature that we are used to exploit, or the gift-character of all
reality, etc. As for our context, it is important to note that this experience of transcendence is not a self-
sufficient experience but is rather intrinsically related to a self-transcendence of the everyday relevancies
that are imposed on us. In other words, only in responding to the call of the ‘‘wholly other’’ we learn to
‘‘see through’’ the relevancies we always already live in without reflecting upon them. (Prayer, as we
argue, is one way to articulate this transcendence which we are.) In this context, Schutz’s concept of
relevance would, without a doubt, deserve further analysis.
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whatever reasons—begin to shift their interest and focus from the world of daily life
and social business as usual to one of prayer. In this situation, religious
consciousness or tension gradually mounts. As this process continues, the activity
of prayer, figuring as a portal to the religious province of meaning, becomes
predominant; the person praying becomes immersed in the religious ‘‘province of
meaning,’’ which entertains no ontological relations with the world of daily life but
rather sheds a new light on its very givenness and the way we are used deal with it.
Given this, the everyday world of collectively shared, secular common sense and
standard time fades away and the religious ‘‘reality’’ becomes the primary site of
rendering the everyday world intelligible otherwise, e.g., in the light of grace, the
gift of love or salvation, or the promise of unconditional hospitality, etc.
Occasionally in the world of prayer, eternal communion, dialogue, and personal
contact with God might come to be realized, but a full-fledged description of such
‘‘achievements’’ of prayer is not the focus of this paper. Towards the end of the
invocation, religious consciousness, mindfulness, attentiveness or tension begins to
fade out, and the person praying returns to the everyday world. This process,
however, repeats and sediments itself in the stream of his/her consciousness at an
unpredictable frequency that not only depends on the believer’s outlook, but
transforms it, too.6
Prayer and Linguistic Philosophy
From the preceding discussion, we can conclude that the reality of prayer, viewed as
an enclave that opens access to the religious finite province of meaning, is
constituted by a specific attitude of practicing consciousness: the significance of
prayer has been located in its capacity to change the direction of the stream of
consciousness from the world of daily life to the religious finite province of
meaning. In a next step, we will now consider the relations that exist between reality
and language in this context.
We should note that Schutz distinguishes his ‘‘finite province of meaning’’ from
James’s ‘‘sub-universe’’ in Principles of Psychology (1890), emphasizing that ‘‘it is
the meaning of our experiences, and not the ontological structure of the objects,
which constitutes reality’’ (Schutz 1945b: 341). If the meaning of our experiences
constitutes reality, then the meaning of experiences during prayer constitutes its
reality, and the meaning of experiences is, without a doubt, connected with
language. In short, the language of prayer is essential for constructing its reality.
When the ‘‘language-game’’ of prayer is applied, the reality of prayer is constructed.
Cupitt states that ‘‘there is no objective reality, no objective truth, no objective
value, and no objective or absolute knowledge’’ validates this conclusion. Reality is
constructed by human language, and even the reality of God could be interpreted as
a projection of language.
6 In this context, we might refer to Husserl’s concept of ‘‘Einstro¨men,’’ (‘‘influx,’’ ‘‘flowing into’’) (see
Husserl 1970: 210) which he coined in order to demonstrate how the experience lived through in the
transcendental attitude is structurally retained after returning to the ‘‘natural attitude,’’ thus modifying and
enriching it in an irrevocable way.
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Lindbeck, a Protestant theologian of doctrine, describes the construction of
reality by language as follows:
[…] it [sc., a religion] is similar to an idiom that makes possible the
description of realities, the formulation of beliefs, and the experiencing of
inner attitudes, feelings, and sentiments […]. It comprises a vocabulary of
discursive and nondiscursive symbols together with a distinctive logic or
grammar in terms of which this vocabulary can be meaningfully deployed.
(Lindbeck 1984: 33)
Thus, we can infer that the senses of reality and language are interdependent or,
perhaps, one and the same.
With regard to our context, Schmidt notes that ‘‘For several 1000 years, people
have thought that some religious assertions were factual claims. If our analysis is
correct, however, this long tradition, still strong in some of our contemporary
theologians, is mistaken […]. Religious claims do not belong to factual knowledge’’
(Schmidt 1968: 224). Wilson, in his analysis of religious language, classifies
sentences employed in Christian literature, creeds, or rituals into five categories,
namely: (1) sentences expressing commands, injunctions, exhortations, and wishes;
(2) sentences expressing moral views; (3) sentences expressing factual, and often
historical, truths; (4) sentences conveying information about the meanings of words,
and expressing analytic truths; and (5) sentences that appear to be informative about
the supernatural or metaphysical world, as opposed to the natural or physical world
(Wilson 1968: 356).
As both Schmidt and Wilson [categories (1) (2) (5)] suggest, sentences used in
the context of Christian literature, creeds, or rituals contain many elements which,
quite often, have nothing to do with facts, logic, and verification. This observation
equally applies in the case of prayer, which is at the core or essence of Christianity.
The words, phrases, and sentences employed in prayer are in sharp contrast to those
used in the natural sciences, factual reports, or rational reasoning. Regarding words
used in prayer, the concept of ‘‘performative utterance,’’ which draws attention to
the performative function of words or language, provides a helpful perspective for
examining prayer.
Austin laid the foundation of ‘‘speech act’’ theory in his analysis of performative
utterances expressed by verbs conjugated in the first person, singular, present,
indicative, active. By the time when his philosophy came to be known, philosophers
had long assumed that the purpose of a statement could only be to describe some
state of affairs, or to state some fact, either correctly or falsely. He, however, argued
that this was not the case. He analyzed performative utterances/sentences by
attending closely to the functions of verbs such as ‘‘promise’’ or ‘‘name’’. He
contended that ‘‘the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action—it is not
normally thought of as just saying something’’. The utterances ‘‘do not ‘describe’ or
‘report’ or constate anything at all, are not ‘true or false,’’’ and ‘‘the uttering of the
sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action’’ (see Austin 1975: 1–7).
Drawing on Austin’s insights, Evans (1963) introduced the idea of performative
utterances to the study of the philosophy of religion, viewing the language of
Christianity as an expression of ‘‘self-involvement’’ and total commitment to God.
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He investigated various articulations of Christian language, which have explicitly or
tacitly adopted the formula: ‘‘I acknowledge X as Y,’’ and interpreted religious
utterances as ‘‘self-involving’’ when they were ‘‘behabitive’’ or ‘‘commissive’’ (see
below). In analyzing these forms of language, he shed new light on the logic of the
activity of commitment:
Older logics deal with propositions (statements, assertions); that is they deal
with relations between propositions and relations between terms of proposi-
tions. Modern biblical theology, however, emphasizes non-propositional
language, both in its account of divine revelation (God’s ‘word’ to man) and in
its account of human religious language (man’s word to God). In each case the
language or ‘word’ is not (or is not merely) propositional; it is self-involving
activity, divine or human […] he [sc., man] addresses God in the activity of
worship, committing himself to God and expressing his attitude to God.
(Evans 1963: 14)
These concepts, namely Austin’s performative utterance and Evans’s self-
involving utterance, are helpful for examining the language used during prayer.
‘‘Behabitives,’’ a kind of performative ‘‘concerned roughly with reactions to
behavior and with behavior towards others and designed to exhibit attitudes and
feelings’’ (Austin 1975: 83), are particularly fruitful for investigating Christian
prayer. Their application supports a view of prayer in terms of its capacity to
construct a religious reality.
To return to the ‘‘Lord’s Prayer,’’ let us recall that this prayer appears in two
forms in the New Testament. The first is the previously cited version in the Gospel
of Matthew (6: 9–13).The second version in the Gospel of Luke (11: 2–4) is as
follows:
He [Jesus] said to them, ‘‘When you pray, say: Father, hallowed be your name.
Your kingdom come.
Give us each day our daily bread.
And forgive us our sins, for we ourselves forgive everyone indebted to us. And
do not bring us to the time of trial’’.
The words and sentences employed in these two versions of the prayer are
expressions of entreaty, desire,7 or aspiration toward God, which are reflected in the
Lord’s Prayer as a whole. They are not factual statements as in the natural sciences
or in our daily life, but rather can be viewed as examples of Austin’s ‘‘performative
utterance’’ and Evans’s ‘‘self-involving utterance’’ in the broad sense of these terms.
Prayers involve a combination of various important elements, which are
performative or self-involving, for example, ‘‘praising,’’ ‘‘confessing,’’ ‘‘thanksgiv-
ing,’’ ‘‘requesting,’’ etc. Some examples extracted from the Bible include: (1)
Praise: ‘‘this is my God, and I will praise him, my father’s God, and I will exalt
him’’ (Exodus 15: 2). (2) Confession: ‘‘If we confess our sins, he [sc. God] who is
7 Chre´tien, criticizing G. Van der Leeuw’s book Religion in Essence and Manifestation (Van der
Leeuw 1964) which distinguishes prayer from adoration, stresses: ‘‘The link between desire [or request]
and prayer is essential, and it can serve to unify the various definitions that have been given of the latter’’
(Chre´tien 2004: 29).
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faithful and just will forgive us our sins and cleanse us from all unrighteousness’’ (1
John 1: 9). (3) Thanksgiving: ‘‘Give thanks to the Lord, for he is good; his love
endures forever’’ (1 Chronicles 16: 34). (4) Requesting: ‘‘Ask, and it will be given to
you’’ (Matthew 7: 7).
To apply Austin’s insights to prayer, the words and sentences employed in
praising, confessing, thanksgiving, or requesting do not in any way describe, report,
or constate facts, and the uttering of these words and sentences is, or is a part of,
performing an action. These are expressions of the believer’s attitude or
commitment to God, and are self-involving performative utterances.8
A belief in God lies at the root of praying. Suppose, for example, that a Christian
says, ‘‘I believe that God exists’’. This statement is not a simple assertion that God
exists, but rather an expression of the person’s total commitment to God. Saying that
‘‘I believe that God exists’’ is a kind of performative action with self-involvement.
This implies that the believer pledges loyalty to God, following His moral
legislation (concerning, for instance, the correct ways how to organize one’s
community in the ‘‘imitatio Christi,’’ epitomized, e.g., in the figure of the ‘‘mystical
body’’). And the explicit issuing of the performative formula, ‘‘I acknowledge X as
Y’’ implies that the subject has a positive attitude or intention toward X. For
example, by stating that: ‘‘I acknowledge the Holy Spirit as the source of life,’’ the
believer performs an action of acknowledgement and expresses an attitude of
acceptance of the Holy Spirit as the source of life and a commitment to the Spirit
(see Evans 1963: 150f.).
Furthermore, even if an explicit performative or self-involving verb such as
‘‘believe’’ or ‘‘acknowledge’’ is absent in sentences of prayer, these characteristics
can be indicated. For example, when a person who is praying says, ‘‘God is my
Creator,’’ while this sentence appears to be a factual statement, it is actually an
abbreviated form of the sentence: ‘‘I believe that God is my Creator,’’ or ‘‘I
acknowledge God as my Creator’’. In short, the formula of ‘‘I believe (in) X’’ or ‘‘I
acknowledge X as Y’’ permeates the language of Christian tradition. Furthermore,
to say ‘‘I committed X’’ is not merely to state a fact, but also to confess the crime X
and to ask God for forgiveness of X. To say, ‘‘my son is seriously ill’’ is not simply
to state a fact, but also to appeal to or ask God to heal him. The language used in
Christian prayer, hence, is of a highly performative or self-involving character.9
8 Chre´tien proposed a phenomenological discussion on the contrast between ‘‘vocal’’ prayer and ‘‘silent’’
prayer (Chre´tien 2004: 31–33). In antiquity, ‘‘praying aloud, clearly and intelligibly, is the most normal
and most common kind of prayer’’ (2004: 32) and ‘‘Vocal prayer puts an end to the disorder of the
murmurous noise within […]. The voice is not [merely] instrumental for prayer’’ (2004: 33). According to
his outlook, the voice of prayer is its essence. Though we generally agree with him, silent/murmurous
prayer is still acceptable, since it is but a variation of vocal prayer.
9 One might insist that when one speaks to oneself in prayer that s/he believes in God, s/he has no
intention at all to prove the existence of God ontologically but that the existence of God would be
rendered objectively valid. In other words, when one enunciates that the holy God be praised, then God is
rendered existent objectively for the person praying. Given that, in a situation when the person praying is
not making a factual statement by expressing his/her belief in God, s/he is not at all claiming that his/her
assertion is only subjectively valid to himself/herself.
In responding to this objection, we propose to understand ‘‘God’’ as ‘‘an intentional object’’ that is
constructed by language’’ (see sec. 2). In other words, we propose not to commit ourselves at this point to
an ontological or theological argument concerning the existence of God; this is beyond our analysis:
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As to our understanding, the preceding ideas can be taken up with reference to
Wittgenstein, and especially with regard to his concept of the ‘‘language-game’’. In
other words, we have thus far analyzed words of performative or self-involving
character on the individual level of the individual word but will now proceed, in the
following discussion, to examine the language of Christianity in terms of a
‘‘system’’ or ‘‘totality’’. Wittgenstein, who was himself devoutly religious, has had a
remarkable influence on philosophy of religion, especially within the analytic
tradition. He wrote the following statement on June 11, 1916 when he was 27 years
old and serving in World War I: ‘‘The meaning of life, i.e., the meaning of the
world, we can call God. / And connect with this the comparison of God to a father. /
To pray10 [emphasis added] is to think about the meaning of life’’ (Wittgenstein
1961: 73). He later included ‘‘praying’’ as a final example of language-games in
section 23 of his Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1958).
Furthermore, in Philosophical Grammar (Wittgenstein 1974), he stated: ‘‘When
we study language we envisage it as a game with fixed rules. We compare it with,
and measure it against, a game of that kind’’ (Wittgenstein 1974: sec. 36). This last
statement by Wittgenstein can also be applied to Christianity, viewed as a system of
language-games that is played with its own rules.
Wittgenstein’s insights enable us to expand on our analytic approach of Christian
prayer, viewed as personal speaking, dialogue, or communion with God that follows
a specific set of Christian rules.11 Prayer can be conceived as a language-activity or
language-game within a finite province of meaning, which is brought about by our
consciousness, and constructs a reality different from that of the world of daily life.
To validate this interpretation of Christianity as ‘‘a system of language-games,’’
excerpts from some sections of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (1969) will be helpful.
The various activities using language in Christianity are not disconnected but form a
vast system of interconnected language activities. In his discussion on testing,
confirmation, argument, and knowledge, Wittgenstein emphasizes the importance of
a system for the conduct of these activities using phrases like ‘‘within a system,’’ ‘‘a
totality of judgments,’’ or ‘‘a whole system of propositions’’. His statements are, as
we shall see below, compatible with Schutz’s theory of ‘‘multiple realities,’’
Footnote 9 continued
‘‘God’’ might or might not exist objectively. Even if the believer pretends to render the existence of God
‘‘objectively valid,’’ it is not ‘‘objective’’ in the strict sense of the word, because atheists or non-Christians
may not accept the objective existence of God. But in any case the existence of God is still construed as
an ‘‘intentional object,’’ since even atheists or non-Christians imagine ‘‘God’’ as an ‘‘intentional object’’.
Though the logic of self-involvement sounds ‘‘subjective,’’ it is our frame of reference not on the level of
object-language but on the level of meta-language.
10 Wittgenstein clearly distinguishes between the ‘‘sayable/speakable’’ world, which is the world of facts,
and the ‘‘unsayable/unspeakable’’ world, which is the world of absolute value or religion. He personally
tried to bridge these two worlds by praying and took a serious view of prayer throughout his life.
11 It is impossible to explicitly identify all of the rules that are followed by believers. As Searle notes, this
is not necessary since: ‘‘It seems obvious to me that it is a rule, and that it is one which we follow without
necessarily knowing (in the sense of being able to formulate) that we do. […] Sometimes in order to
explain adequately a piece of human behavior we have to suppose that it was done in accordance with a
rule, even though the agent himself may not be able to state the rule and may not even be conscious of the
fact that he is acting in accordance with the rule’’ (Searle 1980: 42).
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notably, that: ‘‘there is no possibility of referring one of these provinces to the other
by introducing a formula of transformation’’.
Wittgenstein states:
All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place
already within a system. And this system […] belongs to the essence of what
we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the
element in which arguments have their life. (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 105)
A totality of judgments is made plausible to us. When we first begin to believe
anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of
propositions. (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 140–141)
Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a
particular bit the value we give it. (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 410)
These statements can be applied to religion in the following way: (1) Christians
believe in a whole system of religious propositions. (2) Within this system, each
word, phrase, or sentence can have a meaning. (3) Religious knowledge forms an
enormous system, and it is only within this system that a particular component
(word, phrase, or sentence) has an assigned value.
Lindbeck further stresses the incommensurability of different language-games,
even among the different religions or philosophies:
[…] the cultural-linguistic [sc. Lindbeck’s] approach is open to the possibility
that different religions and/or philosophies may have incommensurable
notions of truth, of experience, and of categorical adequacy, and therefore also
of what it would mean for something to be most important (i.e., ‘‘God’’).
(Lindbeck 1984: 49)
Taking Wittgenstein’s emphasis on a system, totality, or wholeness into
consideration, we may presume that what is real/unreal, true/false, or meaningful/
non meaningful is determined within the whole system of language-games.12 And
we can apply this interpretation to Christianity if we conceptualize it as a system
composed of sub-systems of language-games, one of which is prayer (see below).
12 Our understanding of prayer as an activity in a ‘‘finite province of meaning,’’ which is cut off from
daily language-games, might provoke some objections. It is a serious and important question whether or
not the language of prayer can be broken off from the language-game of daily affairs. For example,
Bochenski, a famous logician, contends that ‘‘RD [sc., religious discourse] is very closely connected with
TD [sc., total discourse] of its user, that is, it cannot be disconnected and considered separately from the
PD [sc., profane discourse] of the same subject. Therefore, the problem of the relations between the two
discourses, the RD and the PD, is here particularly important’’ (Bochenski 1965: 58). Additionally, Sherry
categorizes terms used in Christianity into four groups: (1) Specifically religious terms like ‘God,’ ‘Holy
Trinity,’ and ‘Hell’ in Christianity. (2) Metaphysical terms, for example, ‘omniscient,’ ‘infinite,’ or
‘spirit’. (3) Analogical terms, that is, terms from ordinary language used outside of their normal contexts,
such as ‘father,’ ‘cause,’ ‘make,’ ‘redeem,’ ‘real,’ and ‘truth’. (4) Ordinary terms, for example, ‘death,’
‘peace,’ ‘crucify,’ and common words like ‘and,’ ‘but,’ ‘all,’ and ‘not’ (see Sherry 1977: 57). Terms
belonging to categories (2), (3), and (4) are also employed in non-Christian contexts, and all of the terms
within the four categories are intermingled. However, if we focus on the ‘‘system,’’ ‘‘totality,’’ and
‘‘wholeness’’ of a language-game, as Wittgenstein stresses, it is possible to consider words, phrases, or
sentences as forming their own language-game.
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Many Christian philosophers or theologians, the so-called ‘‘Wittgensteinian
Fideists,’’ who accept Wittgenstein’s above-mentioned insights, maintain that
Christianity, as a whole, is a system of religious language-games based on the idea
of God and a commitment to Him. Their intent is to protect Christianity from attacks
by atheism, the natural sciences, or secular common sense, which do not admit the
existence of God. Phillips, e.g., states: ‘‘the criteria of the meaningfulness of
religious concepts are to be found within religion itself,’’ and ‘‘whether a mistake or
confusion has occurred, is to be recognized by criteria found within religion’’
(Phillips 1965: 12). Evans, parodying the slogan of the ordinary language school,
stresses that ‘‘the basic ‘ordinary’ language to which an analytic philosopher should
appeal when he considers Christian conceptions is biblical language’’ (Evans 1963:
17).
All these Wittgensteinian points can indeed be applied to Christianity, viewed as
a system of language-games that has its own logic or grammar. Different language-
games have their own criteria regarding reality, truth, and meaningfulness. In other
words, Christianity constructs its own system of language-games, which is
qualitatively different from those of atheism, the natural sciences, and secular
common sense. It constructs its own world and is ordered as it is.
A question that arises from this discussion is ‘‘how does Christianity, conceived
as a system of language-games, relate to its central component of prayer?’’ We can
understand prayer in terms of a sub-system of the super-system of Christianity.
Words, phrases, or sentences employed in a prayer have appropriate meanings only
in the context of Christianity. Inserting prayer into Wittgenstein’s previously cited
statement, we may say that the practice of prayer takes place within a Christian
system; that the system is not so much the point of departure as the element in which
prayer has its life; and that only within the system does prayer have the value we
give it.
The stated aim of this paper is to focus on Christian prayer in the present
secularized age because, as Cupitt strikingly demonstrates, it seems almost
impossible in the current era to provide Christian faith with a solid foundation.
However, the answer to the question of whether or not Christian faith must have a
solid ground or foundation to be believed or committed to by believers is ‘‘no’’.
Even if believers have no ground or foundation for their faith, they do not have to
stop devoting themselves to Christianity.
Christianity, or its prayer, consists of framework propositions to which believers
commit themselves, such as ‘‘God exists,’’ ‘‘God created this world,’’ or ‘‘God loves
us’’. Can Christians give us a rational reason or justification for these religious
beliefs? As for the existence of God, someone might say that God has showed
Himself within him/her, or that, as Paul says, ‘‘it is no longer I who live, but it is
Christ who lives in me’’ (Galatians 2: 20). It is, however, very difficult in the present
secular age to rationalize or justify belief in God. However, from the perspective of
language-games, Christians, even if they cannot provide a rationale for the ground
or foundation of their belief, can still believe in Christianity. In other words, the
ground or foundation is neither necessary nor essential to play the language-game of
Christianity, since it is ‘‘groundless’’.
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The process of providing foundations sooner or later comes to an end.
Wittgenstein talks about this process of justification using the metaphor of a spade
and bedrock: ‘‘If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my
spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do’’’ (Wittgenstein
1958: 217). Thus, the process of justification, or providing a foundation, ends here.
A believer who has reached this endpoint just says, ‘‘Here I have arrived at a
foundation of all my beliefs. This position I will hold’’ (Wittgenstein 1969: sec.
246). ‘‘Giving grounds, […], justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end
is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true […] it is our acting, which
lies at the bottom of the language-game’’ (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 204).
The framework propositions of Christianity and its prayer are the ‘‘bedrock’’ that
Wittgenstein describes or ‘‘what has to be accepted, the given’’ (Wittgenstein 1958:
226). The process of creating a foundation or justification ends when we are inclined
to say: ‘‘This is simply what I do’’. Wittgenstein notes: ‘‘At the foundation of well-
founded belief lies belief that is not founded’’ (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 253), and
‘‘the difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing’’ (Wittgenstein 1969:
sec. 166). ‘‘You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something
unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or
unreasonable). It is there—like our life’’ (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 559). The
framework propositions of Christianity and its various forms of prayer cannot be, or
do not have to be, founded or justified, and believers who devote themselves to
prayer would say, ‘‘this is simply what we do’’. Prayer is the linguistic expression of
a believer’s commitment to God. As Wittgenstein states: ‘‘a language-game is only
possible if one trusts something’’ (Wittgenstein 1969: sec. 509), a religious
language-game, too, is possible only if a believer trusts or believes in God.
Concluding Remarks
In the preceding paragraphs, we have presented insights of Schutz, Wittgenstein,
Austin and Evans in order to approach the phenomenon of prayer from both a socio-
phenomenological and a linguistic point of view. Following the linguistic strand, it
has become evident that praying—understood as a performative or self-involving
activity carried out in acts of praising, confessing, thanksgiving, or requesting to
God—plays a basic role in the constitution of one’s religious life-world. In this
context, we have interpreted prayer in Christianity as ‘‘a personal speaking, dialogue
or communion with God’’ put into practice by following a specific set of rules. As
Searle has pointed out in this regard, we may distinguish between two types of rules:
‘‘regulative rules’’ and ‘‘constitutive rules’’. Though we tend to observe the former
in everyday life, we should put an emphasis on the latter in our analysis, since they
‘‘create or define new13 forms of behavior’’ (see Searle 1980: 33–42). And in fact,
Christian prayer, viewed as a groundless language-game, which follows a specific
13 ‘‘New’’ in our context does not necessarily mean ‘‘not existing before’’. It means that every time a
believer devotes himself/herself to prayer, s/he constructs a finite province of meaning with its own
cognitive style in the midst of daily life, even if the content of the prayer is the same as a previous one. It
happens, of course, that a literally ‘‘new’’ prayer comes into existence once it is expressed.
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set of rules, is constitutive inasmuch as it (re)constitutes the correlated ‘‘reality’’ or
‘‘religious finite province of meaning’’ amidst the world of daily life.
In other words, the speech of prayer has its lasting tenor of meaning, and, hence,
the question arises as to its relationship with other language-games in which
Christians nolens volens participate in ordinary life. And in fact, the activity of
prayer is carried out within the paramount reality of the everyday life-world, yet it
results in the constitution of another, i.e., religious ‘‘finite province of meaning’’.
According to Okumura and others, who interpreted prayer as a ‘‘breaking off [of] all
relations with daily life,’’ this reality is closed or cut off from other language-games.
Though Bochenski and Sherry suggest that there is a complicated interplay between
sacred or religious terms/discourse and profane or ordinary terms/discourse in
question (see footnote 12), a linguistic account might insist on the ‘‘within-ness,’’
‘‘totality,’’ or ‘‘wholeness’’ of prayer as a language-game in order to shed new light
on understanding its logical structure. Against this backdrop, we could say that a
person praying is playing an ‘‘in-game’’ which is autonomous or self-contained but
has no means to relate itself to other language-games. It is in this context, however,
that a recourse to Schutz and his theory of the symbol and its eminent role in the
constitution of ‘‘multiple realities’’ may provide a more convincing description of
this situation.
As we have already emphasized, Schutz insists, too, on the fact that ‘‘there is no
possibility of referring one of these provinces to the other by introducing a formula
of transformation’’ (Schutz 1945a: 232). Schutz, however, tackles the problem of
communication that arises in face of this lack of a ‘‘formula of transformation’’ by
implementing his theory of the symbol. Put in a nutshell, he interprets ‘‘symbol’’ as
‘‘an appresentational reference of a higher order’’ as follows:
A symbol can be defined […] as an appresentational reference of a higher
order in which the appresenting member of the pair is an object, fact, or event
within the reality of our daily life, whereas the other appresented member of
the pair refers to an idea which transcends our experience of everyday life.
(Schutz 1945b: 331, 343, 337-339)
The language employed in prayer is, without a doubt, as a whole ‘‘symbolic’’ in
the Schutzian sense of the word. In the context of this paper, for instance, the word
‘‘God’’ used in a prayer represents an appresenting ‘‘object’’ used within the reality
of our daily life and ‘‘something’’ appresented by the word is an ‘‘idea’’ which
transcends the experiential framework of everyday life. Linguistic activities of
praying, such as praising, confessing, thanksgiving, or requesting to God, interlink
‘‘appresenting’’ and ‘‘appresented’’ aspects. In other words, the scheme of
‘‘symbolic appresentation’’ points at the ‘‘indicating quality of the sign’’ (or the
signifier), but must not be confused with the ‘‘scheme of reference,’’ which refers to
what is indicated by the sign (the signified) (see Srubar 2014: 86). In light of this
distinction, we may argue, following Srubar, ‘‘that Schutz was not only thinking of a
theory of signs, but rather of a theory of the semiotic order of the life-world. For
Schutz, the semiosis is thus the constituting force of the life-world, through which
the different realities of the life-world as well as their constitutive levels are related
to, and interwoven with, each other’’ (Srubar 2014: 86).
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Given this, the basic point is not at all about finding a ‘‘formula of
transformation’’; it is not about translating one ‘‘reality’’ into another but rather
about re-lating one such reality to itself in the light of another, i.e., to enable a
different, self-reflective and critical way of relating to itself (and its assumed
totality, rationality, truth, etc.). Put differently, prayer, which embodies and indeed
epitomizes a sort of ‘‘religious epoche´,’’ constitutes, on the one hand, an ‘‘immanent
frame’’ of a closed language-game and, on the other hand, also allows one to ‘‘see
through,’’ as Schutz put it, the immanent order of the paramount reality of the
everyday life-world.
The way Schutz points out a problem of communication between a phenome-
nologist and a man of the ‘‘natural attitude’’ is revealing in this regard:
After having performed the phenomenological reduction, the phenomenologist
finds himself confronted with the difficulty of communicating his knowledge
to the ‘‘dogmatist’’ who remains within the natural attitude. Does not this
presuppose a common ground between them? (Schutz 1945a: 256f.)
To our understanding, the phenomenologist’s standpoint is the key to the solution
of our difficulty. He does not have to leave the ‘‘transcendental attitude’’ and return
to the natural one. The difficulty disappears, as Schutz says, if ‘‘he places himself
‘‘in’’ the natural attitude as a transcendental situation that is seen through by him’’
(Schutz 1945a:257).
This argument is full of suggestiveness to combine Schutzian phenomenology and
linguistic philosophy with a view to arrive at a deeper understanding of the topic at
hand. This specifically Schutzian move helps to get a better and deeper grip on the
social embodiment of prayer in terms of a performative symbolic act. And indeed, man
does not pray to the ‘‘causa sui,’’which is too abstract as an object of prayer, i.e., before
which, as Heidegger famously put it, one could ‘‘neither fall to his knees in awe nor can
he play music and dance’’ (Heidegger 1969: 72) Schutz starts, in a quite similar way,
from the idea of an ‘‘embodied intentionality’’ or a person who accesses another reality
in praying, which enables him/her to ‘‘see through’’ the world and the relevancies of
daily life and let it appear in a different light, e.g., the light of grace, gift, or salvation.
The predominant pragmatic infrastructure and constitution of the everyday world and
its foundational motive, the so-called ‘‘fundamental anxiety,’’ (Schutz 1945a: 228),
thus, is substituted by a different, anti-pragmatic logic, i.e., one which revolves around
the ultimate ‘‘groundlessness’’ of this existence and our obligation and giftedness to
take over responsibility for it.14
As we have attempted to demonstrate, phenomenology and linguistic philosophy
can team up productively when being applied to the analysis of ‘‘prayer’’. Prayer,
consisting of a conscious aspect and a linguistic one, emerges in the world of daily
life and constructs its ‘‘field’’ or ‘‘enclave’’ in the midst of this world. Put
differently, it jumps out of the pre-determined horizons of the flow of consciousness
into the living core of experience, thus opening our self to experiencing forms of
transcendence that exceed the horizontal structure of experience towards ‘‘vertical
modes of givenness’’ (Steinbock 2007).
14 On ‘‘anti-pragmatic motives’’ in Schutz see Barber’s paper in this issue (Barber 2015).
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Prayer, to finally underscore this once more, is not about the social construction
of access to some different ontological reality: the intelligibility of the ‘‘vertical
world’’ derives, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, from this world. We rather have to
conceive it as a fundamental act in the meaningful constitution of a religious life-
world, and it does so in promoting a specific attitude, a style of experiencing, i.e., by
what we have termed a ‘‘religious epoche´’’. The (re)enactment of this ‘‘epoche´’’ is
facilitated by (but not dependent upon) the creation of an ‘‘enclave’’ in the everyday
world (the church, the temple, the sacred site), where symbolic patterns of
interaction and communication (‘‘i.e., symbolic appresentation’’) are socially
derived, routinized, and, at least to some extent, institutionalized (ritualized). Thus
viewed, Schutz’s account indeed offers a productive supplement to a linguistic
approach. In this context, his theory of the symbol—and language in general—is of
paramount importance: in conceiving the symbol as a sort of ‘‘meaning-clip’’
(Srubar 2007: 201–3) which allows us to relate ‘‘multiple realities,’’ the symbolism
of prayer creates an ‘‘enclave’’ in everydayness that makes this symbolic world
tick—giving rise to think always more, i.e., beyond the unanimity of a world
governed by the ‘‘pragmatic motive’’.
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